This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Accession to EMU and exchange rate policies in Central Europe - decision under institutional constraints

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Andreas Freytag ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Currently, five Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are negotiating about the membership in the European Union: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic. There is a broad consensus that they will eventually become members of the European Monetary Union. This requires careful analysis of the appropriate exchange rate regime prior to the accession. The exchange rate arrangement of the EU applicants plays an important - but not exclusive - role in their policy-mix. The history of transition economies as well as of other emerging markets illustrates that exchange rate policies as such are not a distinctive factor for the success and failure of monetary policy with respect to price stability. In this paper it is argued that this outcome has not emerged by chance. There is no naturally superior exchange rate regime that can be applied to all advanced countries in transition aiming at stability. By way of contrast, an exchange rate arrangement is part of the monetary regime, which itself is a component of the economic order. The latter consists of both politically chosen and spontaneously evolved institutions. This leads to the hypothesis that the choice of an exchange rate arrangement in CEE is constrained by this institutional setting. The theoretical considerations as well as empirical evidence indeed suggest that for guaranteeing stability, beside the legal monetary commitment (part of which being the exchange rate regime) the institutional framework in the country is decisive. If the latter matches the commitment, the credibility of a monetary regime is relatively high, obviously encouraging monetary stability. Therefore, the institutional setting in each country should be analysed extensively before an exchange rate arrangement is chosen.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.eestipank.info/pub/en/dokumendid/publikatsioonid/seeriad/uuringud/_2002/_1_2002/index.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bank of Estonia in its series Bank of Estonia Working Papers with number 2002-1.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 11 Oct 2002
Date of revision: 12 Oct 2002
Publication status: published
Handle: RePEc:eea:boewps:wp2002-01

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Estonia bld. 13, 15095 Tallinn, ESTONIA
Phone: +3726680719
Fax: +3726680900
Email:
Web page: http://www.bankofestonia.info
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: Estonia bld. 13, 15095 Tallinn, ESTONIA
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Peeter Luikmel).

Related research
Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Inci Ötker & Hugh Bredenkamp & A. Javier Hamann & Esteban Jadresic & R. B. Johnston & Paul R. Masson & Barry J. Eichengreen, 1998. "Exit Strategies: Policy Options for Countries Seeking Exchange Rate Flexibility," IMF Occasional Papers 168, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Robert J. Barro, 1983. "Inflationary Finance under Discretion and Rules," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 1-16, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Eijffinger, S-C-W & de Haan, J, 1996. "The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence," Princeton Studies in International Economics 19, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Andreas Freytag, 2004. "EMU Enlargement: Which Concept of Convergence to Apply?," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 11/2004, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jurgen Von Hagen & Iulia Siedschlag, 2008. "Managing Capital Flows: Experiences from Central and Eastern Europe," Papers WP234, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Use the JEL tree to browse through the database by subfields.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.