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The Relative Efficiency of Automatic and Discretionary Industrial Aid

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  • Swales, J. Kim

Abstract

For the last two decades, the primary instruments for UK regional policy have been discretionary subsidies. Such aid is targeted at additional projects - projects that would not have been implemented without the subsidy - and the subsidy should be the minimum necessary for the project to proceed. Discretionary subsidies are thought to be more efficient than automatic subsidies, where many of the aided projects are non-additional and all projects receive the same subsidy rate. The present paper builds on Swales (1995) and Wren (2007a) to compare three subsidy schemes: an automatic scheme and two types of discretionary scheme, one with accurate appraisal and the other with appraisal error. These schemes are assessed on their expected welfare impacts. The particular focus is the reduction in welfare gain imposed by the interaction of appraisal error and the requirements for accountability. This is substantial and difficult to detect with conventional evaluation techniques.

Suggested Citation

  • Swales, J. Kim, 2008. "The Relative Efficiency of Automatic and Discretionary Industrial Aid," SIRE Discussion Papers 2008-50, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    • Handle: RePEc:edn:sirdps:63
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10943/63
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. D. Evans & E. Kula & H. Sezer, 2005. "Regional welfare weights for the UK: England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(7), pages 923-937.
    2. Criscuolo, Chiara & Martin, Ralf & Overman, Henry & Van Reenen, John, 2012. "The Causal Effects of an Industrial Policy," IZA Discussion Papers 6323, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Colin Wren, 2007. "Reconciling Practice with Theory in the Micro-Evaluation of Regional Policy," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(3), pages 321-337.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    5. Eric Mcvittie & J. Kim Swales, 2007. "'Constrained Discretion' in UK Monetary and Regional Policy," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(2), pages 267-280.
    6. Gary Gillespie & Peter Mcgregor & J. Kim Swales & Ya Ping Yin, 2001. "The Displacement and Multiplier Effects of Regional Selective Assistance: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(2), pages 125-139.
    7. Kim Swales, 1997. "A cost-benefit approach to the evaluation of regional selective assistance," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 18(1), pages 73-85, February.
    8. Holden, Darryl R & Swales, J K, 1995. "The Additionality, Displacement and Substitution Effects of Factor Subsidies," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 42(2), pages 113-126, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. J Kim Swales, 2010. "The Relative Efficiency of Automatic and Discretionary Regional Aid," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 42(2), pages 434-451, February.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R13 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy
    • R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis

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