The Redistributive Role of Non-profit Organizations
AbstractBy starting from the consideration that non-profit organizations cover a significant redistributive function beside that of governmental agencies, the paper questions why government prefers to finance via transfers private entities (lucrative and non-lucrative) rather than produce these goods directly. By generalizing the Hansmann (1986) theory we propose a “make or buy” approach in which the choice among three different ownership regimes (governmental, non- profit and for-profit) providing services in public benefit-oriented sectors is affected not only by costs reduction (X-efficiency) but also by the level of transfers (degree of “universalism”) decided at a political level.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia in its series Documentos de trabajo - Analise Economica with number 0036.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
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non-profit organizations; redistribution; property rights;
Other versions of this item:
- Cerulli, Giovanni, 2006. "The redistributive role of non-profit organizations," MPRA Paper 28, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- P14 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Property Rights
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- John C. McManus, 1975. "The Costs of Alternative Economic Organizations," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 8(3), pages 334-50, August.
- Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
- Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-49, June.
- Tobin, James, 1970. "On Limiting the Domain of Inequality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 263-77, October.
- Giovanni Cerulli, 2006. "Una Matrice di Contabilità Sociale per il welfare mix: l'integrazione del settore non-profit. Prime verifiche empiriche ed effetti occupazionali per l'Italia," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 96(2), pages 79-128, March-Apr.
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