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Strategic Registration of Voters: The Chilean Case

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  • Giacomo De Luca

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    Abstract

    In this paper we investigate how the employment relationship, if it implies transfer of rents, may allow employers to control the voting behavior of their workers and lead to strategic registration of voters. This is feasible when individual voting behavior is observable, as in open ballot elections. More easily controlled voters are more likely registered providing an even larger impact of vote controlling on election results. Making individual vote truly secret (for instance with the adoption of a secret ballot) significantly reduces this control. Moreover, we show that as long as electoral districts are heterogeneous enough, i.e., contain also free voters, any attempt to control votes on the basis of district aggregate results is bound to fail. We test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the effects of the introduction of thesecret ballot in Chile in 1958.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University in its series CEDI Discussion Paper Series with number 08-17.

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    Length: 25 pages
    Date of creation: Jun 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:edb:cedidp:08-17

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    1. Jean-Marie Baland & James A. Robinson, 2006. "Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile," NBER Working Papers 12517, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1985. "A Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 352-67, June.
    3. Mathewson, G Frank & Winter, Ralph A, 1985. "The Economics of Franchise Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 503-26, October.
    4. Rajiv Lal, 1990. "Price Promotions: Limiting Competitive Encroachment," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 9(3), pages 247-262.
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