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Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed Bid Auctions Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Roberto Burguet (Institute for Economic Analysis)
Martin Perry (Rutgers University)
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Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number
1827.
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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1827Contact details of provider: Phone: 1 212 998 3820 Fax: 1 212 995 4487 Email: Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp More information through EDIRC
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1989.
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Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 291-308, May.
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Yvan Lengwiler & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2000.
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CESifo Working Paper Series
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Other versions: Marco Celentani & Juan J. Ganuza, 2000.
"Corruption and Competition in Procurement ,"
Economics Working Papers
464, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Mar 2001.
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Other versions: Waehrer, Keith & Perry, Martin K, 2003.
" The Effects of Mergers in Open-Auction Markets ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
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Marshall Robert C. & Meurer Michael J. & Richard Jean-Francois & Stromquist Walter, 1994.
"Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
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Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, 1986.
"A note on competitive bribery games ,"
Economics Letters ,
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Compte, O. & Lambert-Mogiliansky, A. & Verdier, T., 2000.
"Corruption and Competition in Public Market Auctions ,"
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2000-01, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
Other versions: Rasmusen, Eric & Ramseyer, J Mark, 1994.
" Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game among Rational Legislators ,"
Public Choice ,
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Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991.
"Auction design and favoritism ,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 9-42, March.
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Federico Weinschelbaum & Leandro Arozamena, 2004.
"The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions ,"
Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings
180, Econometric Society.
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Allan Ingraham, 2005.
"A Test for Collusion between a Bidder and an Auctioneer in Sealed-Bid Auctions ,"
Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy ,
Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1448-1448.
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Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1975.
"The economics of corruption ,"
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Keith Waehrer & Martin Perry, 2002.
"The Effects of Mergers in Open Auction Markets ,"
Departmental Working Papers
200203, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Federico Weinschelbaum & Leandro Arozamena, 2004.
"The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions ,"
Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings
180, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
René Kirkegaard, 2007.
"Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds ,"
Working Papers
0702, Brock University, Department of Economics.
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Leonardo Rezende, 2009.
"Biased procurement auctions ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 169-185, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Yvan Lengwiler & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2005.
"Bid Rigging. An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions ,"
Discussion Papers
39, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2008.
"Preferred Suppliers in Auction Markets ,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
752.08, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
[Downloadable!]
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