Markets with Simultaneous Signaling and Screening
AbstractWe model markets with adverse selection as matching markets. In a given match the informed or the uniformed party is chosen to make a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. This allows to account for the simultaneous presence of signaling and screening. Moreover, the possibility to dissolve matches unsuccessfully allows to endogenize the distribution of types in the market. It will be shown that this approach overcomes the well-known trade-off between ensuring existence (in signaling games) and obtaining clear-cut results (in screening games).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 0614.
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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