This paper models individual choices of social groups and the formation of group identity, and examines the conditions with which the group identity reinforces the productivity of individuals. A social group is defined as a network that provides with a market for interactions to its members. Individuals choose their social groups according to their identity and the expected transaction costs in each group. Due to network externality, there is a higher value of transaction and more socialization for a popular group. Transaction cost in each group is a function of the homogeneity of its members and the popularity of the group. The group productivity defined by the average ability of the members in a social category may be conducive to the popularity of the group when the group members are homogeneous.
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