IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Ordinal Egalitarian Solution for Finite Choice Sets


  • Simon Wilkie
  • John P. Conley


Rubinstein Safra and Thomson (1992) introduced the Ordinal Nash Bargaining Solution. They proved that Pareto Optimality, Ordinal Invariance, Ordinal Symmetry, and IIA characterize this solution. They restrict attention to a domain of social choice problem with an infinite set of basic alternatives. In this paper we show this restriction is necessary. More specifically, we demonstrate that no solution can satisfy their list of axioms on any finite domain nor even on the space of lotteries defined over a finite set of alternatives. We then introduce the Ordinal Egalitarian Bargaining Solution. We show both for a space of finite social choice problems and for the space of lotteries over a finite set of social alternatives, that this solution is characterized by the axioms of Pareto Optimality, Ordinal Invariance, Ordinal Symmetry, and Independence of Pareto Irrelevant Alternatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Wilkie & John P. Conley, 2004. "The Ordinal Egalitarian Solution for Finite Choice Sets," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 662, Econometric Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:662

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2010. "Endogenous Constitutions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(543), pages 1-39, March.
    2. Torsten Persson & Gérard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202.
    3. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "Choosing How to Choose: Self Stable Majority Rules," Microeconomics 0211003, EconWPA.
    4. Matthias Messner & Mattias K. Polborn, 2004. "Voting on Majority Rules," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 115-132.
    5. Voigt, Stefan, 1997. "Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 11-53, March.
    6. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 115-138.
    7. Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, 2003. "Incomplete Social Contracts," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(1), pages 38-67, March.
    8. Philippe Aghion & Alberto Alesina & Francesco Trebbi, 2004. "Endogenous Political Institutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(2), pages 565-611.
    9. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2004. "Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(3), pages 1011-1048.
    10. Hans Gersbach, 2002. "Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series 749, CESifo Group Munich.
    11. Giovanni Maggi & Massimo Morelli, 2006. "Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1137-1158, September.
    12. Giovannoni, Francesco, 2003. "Amendment Rules in Constitutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(1-2), pages 37-61, April.
    13. Mueller, Dennis C, 1991. "Constitutional Rights," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 313-333, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    ordinal solution; egalitarian; bargaining;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:662. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.