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Selection Effects on Trust and Trustworthiness

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  • Robert Slonim

Abstract

Field and experimental research demonstrate the positive relationship between efficiency and both trust and trustworthiness. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (BDM), 1995, first showed the existence and strength of both trust and trustworthiness in a laboratory economic experiment. Building off BDM, many studies examine mediating and moderating factors (e.g., demographics, learning and surplus) that may affect trust and trustworthiness. However, in these studies, as in most laboratory studies, trust and trustworthiness are measured based on pre-assigned partner relationships. The current paper examines trust and trustworthiness in a variant of the BDM game in which subjects select partners based on their potential partner’s gender and on a proxy for their partner’s analytical ability. We hypothesize and test for a positive influence of selection on trust and trustworthiness. We expect selection to increase perceptions of individual control and identification with partners, and that both of these factors will increase trust. We also expect selection to increase a sense of reciprocity, and that this will increase trustworthiness. Survey questions examine these mediating factors as well as several moderating factors such as general and specific trust and trustworthiness attitudes. The results support the hypothesis that trustworthiness increases significantly when players are given a choice of partners, but we do not find evidence that trust increases with partner selection.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Slonim, 2004. "Selection Effects on Trust and Trustworthiness," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 650, Econometric Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:650
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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments

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