An empirical examination of household public goods provision
AbstractHouseholds have many economic roles in society. One of such roles is to share household-level public goods that are jointly consumed by members of the household. Several theoretical models have been proposed in the literature: the unitary model, the non-cooperative game theoretical model and the bargaining model. Identifying those models is important due to implications for public policy. The unitary model predicts the amount of household public goods is neutral with respect to income distribution between husband and wife, and the non-cooperative game theoretical model predicts the neutrality of public goods when both the husband and the wife contribute household public goods. Using both the information on Japanese Tax reforms conducted in the 1990s as natural experiments and Japanese panel data that has information on household expenditures in detail, we examine the relevance of the unitary model and the non-cooperative game theoretical model. We found that the neutrality result does not hold in our data. This suggests that we need another economic theory since the unitary model, the non-cooperative game modle and the bargaining model also imply some types of neutrality
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings with number 474.
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
More information through EDIRC
household public goods provision;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Agathe Rouaix & Charles Figuières & Marc Willinger, 2013. "The trade-off between welfare and equality in a public good experiment," Working Papers, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier 13-03, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Feb 2013.
- Anderson, Siwan & Eswaran, Mukesh, 2009. "What determines female autonomy? Evidence from Bangladesh," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 179-191, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.