bundling electronic journals and competition among publishers
AbstractSite licensing of e-journals has been revolutionizing the way academic information is distributed. However, many librarians are concerned about the possibility that publishers might abuse site licensing by practicing bundling. In this paper, we analyze how bundling affects journal pricing in the context of STM electronic journal market and offer a novel insight on the bundling of a large number of information goods. We find that (i) when bundling is prohibited, surprisingly, market structure does not affect prices (ii) when bundling is allowed, each publisher finds bundling optimal and bundling increases the industry profit while reducing social welfare and (iii) any asymmetry-increasing merger is profitable but reduces social welfare
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings with number 720.
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
More information through EDIRC
Bundling; Site Licensing; Interconnection; Merger;
Other versions of this item:
- Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2006. "Bundling Electronic Journals and Competition among Publishers," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(5), pages 1038-1083, 09.
- Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2003. "Bundling electronic journals and competition among publishers," Economics Working Papers 678, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Aug 2005.
- Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2005. "Bundling Electronic Journals and Competition among Publishers," Working Papers 270, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-10-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2004-10-30 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2004-10-30 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAW-2004-10-30 (Law & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gilles Chemla & Gilles Chemla, 2003. "Downstream Competition, Foreclosure and Vertical Integration," Post-Print halshs-00679847, HAL.
- G. Chemla, 1999.
"Downstream competition, foreclosure, and vertical integration,"
THEMA Working Papers
99-18, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Chemla, G., 1999. "Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration," Papers 99-18, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2001.
"Free Labour for Costly Journals?,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 183-198, Fall.
- Ted Bergstrom, 2001. "Free Labor for Costly Journals?," Microeconomics 0106002, EconWPA.
- Bergstrom, Ted, 2001. "Free Labor for Costly Journals?," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt5jc0893p, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- repec:fth:calaec:16-01 is not listed on IDEAS
- Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, 1997.
"Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits and Efficiency,"
Working Paper Series
199, MIT Center for Coordination Science.
- Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, 1999. "Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(12), pages 1613-1630, December.
- Chemla, Gilles, 2003. "Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6313, Paris Dauphine University.
- Armstrong, Mark, 1999.
"Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 151-68, January.
- Armstrong, M., 1996. "Price discrimination by a many-product firm," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9628, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John & Whinston, Michael D, 1989. "Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 371-83, May.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.