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International financial rescues and debtor-country moral hazard

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Author Info
Ashley Taylor
Prasanna Gai

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Abstract

This paper examines whether recent international policy initiatives to facilitate financial rescues in emerging market countries have influenced debtors' incentives to access official sector resources. The paper highlights a country's systemic importance as a key characteristic that drives access to official sector finance. It estimates the effect of these financial rescue initiatives on IMF programme participation using a pooled probit model. The safety net permitting exceptional access is shown to have a greater marginal impact on official sector resource usage, the more systemically important the debtor country. The results can be interpreted as offering some support for the presence of debtor-country moral hazard

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings with number 561.

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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:feam04:561

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Related research
Keywords: Moral Hazard; International Lending; Financial Crises;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Andrew G Haldane & J"rg Scheibe, . "IMF lending and creditor moral hazard," Bank of England working papers 216, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
  2. Barry Eichengreen & Andrew K. Rose & Charles Wyplosz, 1996. "Contagious Currency Crises," NBER Working Papers 5681, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Durand, Franck & Geoffard, Pierre-Yves, 1998. "Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: First lessons from a French natural experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 499-511, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Timothy D. Lane & Steven Phillips, 2000. "Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?," IMF Working Papers 00/168, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Richard Blundell & Thomas MaCurdy, 1998. "Labour supply: A review of alternative approaches," IFS Working Papers W98/18, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    Other versions:
  6. Joyce, Joseph P., 1992. "The economic characteristics of IMF program countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 237-242, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 2000. "Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(467), pages F672-94, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Robert J. Barro & Jong-Wha Lee, 2002. "IMF Programs: Who is Chosen and What Are the Effects?," NBER Working Papers 8951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Kaminsky, Graciela L. & Reinhart, Carmen M., 2000. "On crises, contagion, and confusion," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 145-168, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Chiappori, Pierre Andre & Salanie, Bernard, 2002. "Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Andy Haldane & Mark Kruger, 2001. "The Resolution of International Financial Crises: Private Finance and Public Funds," Working Papers 01-20, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  12. Isabel Schnabel & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2002. "Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending: A Test," IMF Working Papers 02/181, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  13. Knight, Malcolm & Santaella, Julio A., 1997. "Economic determinants of IMF financial arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 405-436, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jong-Wha Lee & Kwanho Shin, 2005. "IMF Bailouts and Moral Hazard," International Finance 0501005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Andrew G Haldane & J"rg Scheibe, . "IMF lending and creditor moral hazard," Bank of England working papers 216, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
  3. Axel Dreher, 2004. "Does the IMF cause moral hazard? A critical review of the evidence," International Finance 0402003, EconWPA, revised 29 Mar 2004. [Downloadable!]
  4. Axel Dreher, 2008. "IMF Conditionality: Theory and Evidence," KOF Working papers 08-188, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Philipp Maier, 2007. "Do We Need the IMF to Resolve a Crisis? Lessons from Past Episodes of Debt Restructuring," Working Papers 07-10, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  6. Gregor Irwin & David Vines, . "The efficient resolution of capital account crises: how to avoid moral hazard," Bank of England working papers 233, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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