Stukel, Sundaram, Reka (U of Wisconsin) Barham, Bradford L.
Abstract
This paper examines the role of two types of reputation - borrower credit history and productivity - in disequilibrium supply and demand models of loan size dynamics in formal and informal credit markets. Using panel data on Honduran households, full- and partialinformation regime switching econometric models yield four principal findings: (1) credit contracts in the formal sector are largely collateral driven and not reputation driven; (2) the informal sector credit contracts are borrower reputation based; (3) the informal sector utilizes positive/negative credit histories in both markets to credibly reward/punish borrowers; and (4) technical efficiency has a positive impact in determining loan size in both sectors on the demand and supply side of the market.
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Paper provided by University of Wisconsin, Agricultural and Applied Economics in its series Staff Paper Series with number
520.