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What Determines State Capture in Poland>

Author

Listed:
  • Alwasiak, Stanislaw

    (Cracrow University of Economics)

  • Lewandowska-Kalina, Monika

    (Warsaw School of Economics)

  • Kalina, Lech

    (Warsaw School of Economics)

  • Kowalewski, Oskar

    (Kozminski University and Warsaw School of Economics)

  • MOzdzen, Michal

    (Cracow University)

  • Rybinski, Kryzysztof

    (Vistula Unversity)

Abstract

In this paper we examine the determinants of ex-ante state capture analyzing all the legal acts that have been passed in the period 1990-2011 in Poland. We find that during this period 37 percent of legal acts were passed with the aim to satisfy the interest of particular groups. Furthermore, the regression analysis shows that the likelihood of state capture increases during the period of economic growth and local elections. The likelihood of state capture, however, declines during presidential elections. The results we attribute to different interests of political parties in the period of local and presidential election. Finally, we find that the state capture increased over the years in Poland. Additionally, we show that the EU accession did not prevent state capture in Poland. In contrast, the financial crisis of 2007 resulted in a wake-up effect and the likelihood of state capture declined in Poland.

Suggested Citation

  • Alwasiak, Stanislaw & Lewandowska-Kalina, Monika & Kalina, Lech & Kowalewski, Oskar & MOzdzen, Michal & Rybinski, Kryzysztof, 2013. "What Determines State Capture in Poland>," Working Papers 13-07, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:upafin:13-07
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    File URL: http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/13/13-07.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Miklos Szanyi, 2014. "Privatization and state property management in post-transition economies," IWE Working Papers 211, Institute for World Economics - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    2. Krzysztof Beck & Michał Możdżeń, 2020. "Institutional Determinants of Budgetary Expenditures. A BMA-Based Re-Evaluation of Contemporary Theories for OECD Countries," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(10), pages 1-31, May.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal

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