Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory
AbstractThis is the first draft of a chapter for the forthcoming Handbook of Epistemic Logic, edited by Hans van Ditmarsch, Joe Halpern, Wiebe van der Hoek and Barteld Kooi (College Publications). Contents: 1. Introduction 2. Epistemic Models of Strategic-Form Games 3. Semantic Analysis of Common Belief of Rationality 4. Syntactic Characterization of Common Belief of Rationality 5. Common Belief versus Common Knowledge 6. Probabilistic Beliefs and von Neumann- Morgenstern Payoffs 7. Dynamic Games with Perfect Information 8. The Semantics of Belief Revision 9. Common Belief of Rationality in Perfect-Information Games 10. Literature Review.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California at Davis, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2012-11.
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision:
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-06-13 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-06-13 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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