It is natural to think of belief revision as the interaction of belief and information over time. Thus branching-time temporal logic seems a natural setting for a theory of belief revision. We propose two extensions of a modal logic that, besides the "next-time" temporal operator, contains a belief operator and an information operator. The first logic is shown to provide an axiomatization of the first six postulates of the AGM theory of belief revision, while the second, stronger, logic provides an axiomatization of the full set of AGM postulates.
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Paper provided by University of California at Davis, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
06-17.