A Simple Modal Logic for Belief Revision
AbstractWe propose a logic based on three modal operators, representing initial beliefs, information and revised beliefs. Three simple and transparent axioms are used to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the qualitative part of Bayes' rule. Some theorems of this logic are derived concerning the interaction between current beliefs and future beliefs. Information flows and iterated revision are also discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California at Davis, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 04-5.
Date of creation: Dec 2004
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Other versions of this item:
- Bonanno, Giacomo, 2005. "A Simple Modal Logic for Belief Revision," Working Papers 05-17, University of California at Davis, Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2004. "A simple modal logic for belief revision," Working Papers 45, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2005. "A simple modal logic for belief revision," Working Papers 517, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- C65 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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9518, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
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Games and Economic Behavior,
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05-41, University of California at Davis, Department of Economics.
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