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Existence of Equilibria in Auctions with Private Values

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  • Govindan, Srihari
  • Wilson, Robert

    (Stanford University)

Abstract

A first-price sealed-bid auction of an item for which bidders are risk-neutral and have privately known values is shown to have an equilibrium in mixed behavioral strategies if the joint distribution of bidders' values has a continuous density on a cubical support. Such an equilibrium has atomless distributions of bids and is not affected by the rule for resolving tied bids.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 2056.

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Date of creation: Feb 2010
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Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:2056

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