Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Shares, Coalition Formation and Political Development: Evidence from Seventeenth Century England

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jha, Saumitra

    (Stanford U)

Abstract

A key challenge for developing societies is to build coalitions across disparate interests in favour of beneficial policies. This paper documents the role of a financial innovation-- shares--in aligning disparate interests in favour of representative government during England's Civil War (1642-48). Using novel micro-data, the paper shows that shareholding was a major determinant of support for political reform by members of parliament. The paper suggests that shares allowed a broad spectrum of investors to benefit from new opportunities overseas. However, overseas rights belonged chiefly to the executive. Thus the introduction of shares aligned incentives in favour of political reforms and overseas policies crucial for growth.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP2005.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 2005.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:2005

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015
Phone: (650) 723-2146
Fax: (650)725-6750
Email:
Web page: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
  2. Alesina, Alberto & Baqir, Reza & Easterly, William, 1999. "Public goods and ethnic divisions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2108, The World Bank.
  3. Quinn, Stephen, 2001. "The Glorious Revolution'S Effect On English Private Finance: A Microhistory, 1680 1705," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(03), pages 593-615, September.
  4. Richard Grassby, 1970. "The Personal Wealth of the Business Community in Seventeenth-Century England," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, Economic History Society, vol. 23(2), pages 220-234, 08.
  5. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 803-832, December.
  6. Rapp, Richard T., 1975. "The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony: International Trade Rivalry and the Commercial Revolution," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(03), pages 499-525, September.
  7. Abhijit Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer & Rohini Somanathan, 2005. "History, Social Divisions, and Public Goods in Rural India," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 639-647, 04/05.
  8. Carlos, Ann M. & Key, Jennifer & Dupree, Jill L., 1998. "Learning and the Creation of Stock-Market Institutions: Evidence from the Royal African and Hudson's Bay Companies, 1670–1700," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(02), pages 318-344, June.
  9. Yadira Gonzalez de Lara & Avner Greif & Saumitra Jha, 2008. "The Administrative Foundations of Self-Enforcing Constitutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 105-09, May.
  10. Patrick K. O'Brien, 1988. "The political economy of British taxation, 1660-1815," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, Economic History Society, vol. 41(1), pages 1-32, 02.
  11. Sussman, Nathan & Yafeh, Yishay, 2004. "Constitutions and Commitment: Evidence on the Relation Between Institutions and the Cost of Capital," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 4404, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Capitalism - making life better
    by Nicholas Gruen in Club Troppo on 2009-02-09 12:22:33

RePEc Biblio mentions

As found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography for Economics:
  1. > Microeconomics > Transaction Cost Economics
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Cox, Gary W., 2012. "Was the Glorious Revolution a Constitutional Watershed?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(03), pages 567-600, September.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:2005. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.