Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Retail Competition and the Dynamics of Consumer Demand for Tied Goods

Contents:

Author Info

  • Hartmann, Wesley R.

    (Stanford U)

  • Nair, Harikesh S.

Abstract

We empirically investigate the demand for tied goods sold through competing retail channels. Tied good pricing strategies commonly involve a low price on the initial purchase (i.e. the primary good) to drive adoption, and a substantial markup on aftermarket goods to capture value. However, if the goods are sold through downstream channels, retail market power and a misalignment of incentives could distort the relative prices of primary and aftermarket goods. To evaluate whether retail competition is strong enough to prevent such distortions, we explore the commonly noted example of razors and blades, which are sold through drug, grocery, mass merchandising, and club stores. We specify a forward-looking demand model that incorporates dynamics arising from the tied good nature of the products and the stockpiling and durability aspects of razors and blades. Furthermore, we allow intertemporal substitution in the purchase of both razors and blades to occur across channels as well as time. This modeling feature enables a novel approach to measuring retail competition in single category demand analyses. Our estimates indicate that there is substantial cross-channel substitution in razors, but some retail market power in blades. However, the channel with the most market power in blades, club stores, specializes in high volume customers that would adopt a razor even if blade prices are higher. This suggests that the manufacturer can achieve its desired level of razor adoption without vertical restraints, though blade sales may be slightly reduced by double marginalization.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP1990.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 1990.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1990

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015
Phone: (650) 723-2146
Fax: (650)725-6750
Email:
Web page: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Daniel A. Ackerberg, 2001. "A New Use of Importance Sampling to Reduce Computational Burden in Simulation Estimation," NBER Technical Working Papers 0273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Severin Borenstein & Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason & Janet S. Netz, 2000. "Exercising Market Power in Proprietary Aftermarkets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 157-188, 06.
  3. J. Miguel Villas-Boas, 1998. "Product Line Design for a Distribution Channel," Marketing Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 17(2), pages 156-169.
  4. Tülin Erdem & Susumu Imai & Michael Keane, 2003. "Brand and Quantity Choice Dynamics Under Price Uncertainty," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 5-64, March.
  5. Schmalensee, Richard., 1980. "Monopolistic two-part pricing arrangements," Working papers 1105-80., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  6. Klein, Benjamin & Murphy, Kevin M, 1988. "Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 265-97, October.
  7. Nair, Harikesh S. & Chintagunta, Pradeep & Dube, Jean-Pierre, 2003. "Empirical Analysis of Indirect Network Effects in the Market for Personal Digital Assistants," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business 1948, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  8. Rust, John, 1987. "Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 999-1033, September.
  9. Hans M. Amman & David A. Kendrick, . "Computational Economics," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number comp1, Spring.
  10. Brett R. Gordon, 2009. "A Dynamic Model of Consumer Replacement Cycles in the PC Processor Industry," Marketing Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 28(5), pages 846-867, 09-10.
  11. Rust, John, 1996. "Numerical dynamic programming in economics," Handbook of Computational Economics, Elsevier, in: H. M. Amman & D. A. Kendrick & J. Rust (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 619-729 Elsevier.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Ailawadi, K.H. & Bradlow, E.T. & Draganska, M. & Nijs, V. & Rooderkerk, R.P. & Sudhir, K. & Wilbur, K.C. & Zhang, J., 2010. "Empirical models of manufacturer-retailer interaction: A review and agenda for future research," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-4163972, Tilburg University.
  2. Draganska, Michaela & Klapper, Daniel & Villas-Boas, Sofia B., 2008. "A Larger Slice or a Larger Pie? An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining Power in the Distribution Channel," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business 2001, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  3. Phillip Leslie & Alan Sorensen, 2009. "The Welfare Effects of Ticket Resale," NBER Working Papers 15476, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1990. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.