Firms' Choice of Regulation Instruments to Reduce Pollution: A Tansaction Cost Approach
AbstractThis paper extends transaction costs economics to analyze relationships between firms and regulatory agencies. It compares the economic efficiency of firm-agency governance structures for dealing with pollution reduction. The transaction costs of three ideal type governance structures are analyzed: command and control regulation, market based mechanisms, and negotiated agreements. We propose that the choice of governance structure will depend on the strategies firms are pursuing given their transaction attributes and market opportunities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 1806.
Date of creation: May 2003
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