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Social Inequality and the Reduction of Ideological Dissonance on Behalf of the System: Evidence of Enhanced System Justification among the Disadvantaged

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  • Jost, John T.

    (Stanford U)

  • Pelham, Brett W.

    (State U of New York, Buffalo)

  • Sullivan, Bilian Ni

    (Stanford U)

  • Sheldon, Oliver

Abstract

According to system justification theory, people are motivated to preserve the belief that existing social arrangements are fair, legitimate, and justifiable (Jost & Banaji, 1994). The strongest form of this hypothesis, which draws on the logic of cognitive dissonance theory, holds that people who are most disadvantaged by the status quo would have the greatest psychological need to reduce ideological dissonance and would therefore be most likely to support, defend, and justify existing social systems, authorities, and outcomes. Variations on this hypothesis were tested in four U.S. national survey studies. We found that: (a) low income respondents and African Americans were more likely than others to support limitations on the rights of citizens and media representatives to criticize the government (b) low income Latinos were more likely to trust in U.S. government officials and to believe that "the government is run for the benefit of all" than were high income Latinos, (c) Southerners in the U.S. were more likely to endorse meritocratic belief systems than were Northerners and poor and Southern African Americans were more likely to subscribe to meritocratic ideologies than were African Americans who were more affluent and from the North, (d) low income respondents and African Americans were more likely than others to believe that economic inequality is legitimate and necessary, and (e) stronger endorsement of meritocratic ideology was associated with greater satisfaction with one's own economic situation. Taken together, these findings provide support for the dissonance-based argument that people who suffer the most from a given state of affairs are paradoxically the least likely to question, challenge, reject, or change it. Implications for theories of system justification, cognitive dissonance, and social change are also discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Jost, John T. & Pelham, Brett W. & Sullivan, Bilian Ni & Sheldon, Oliver, 2001. "Social Inequality and the Reduction of Ideological Dissonance on Behalf of the System: Evidence of Enhanced System Justification among the Disadvantaged," Research Papers 1671, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1671
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rabin, Matthew, 1994. "Cognitive dissonance and social change," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 177-194, March.
    2. Akerlof, George A & Dickens, William T, 1982. "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 307-319, June.
    3. Jost, John T. & Haines, Elizabeth L., 2000. "Placating the Powerless: Effects of Legitimate and Illegitimate Explanation on Affect, Memory and Stereotyping," Research Papers 1606, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jost, John T. & Jimenez, Maria C. & Kay, Aaron C., 2001. "Sour Grapes and Sweet Lemons: The Rationalization of Anticipated Electoral Outcomes," Research Papers 1680, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.

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