Organizations Non-gratae? The Impact of Unethical Corporate Behavior On Interorganizational Networks
AbstractWe investigate whether the size and quality of the networks of firms engaging in illegal/unethical acts are affected by those acts. Using legitimacy, status, and resource dependence theories, we hypothesize that size will be affected and quality will deteriorate. Using a sample of 208 firms, we find that network size increases, but network quality deteriorates as the result of unethical acts. We also find the more illegitimate the act, the greater the deterioration in quality.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 1623.
Date of creation: Jul 2000
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015
Phone: (650) 723-2146
Web page: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jacquemin, Alexis & Nambu, Tsuruhiko & Dewez, Isabelle, 1981. "A Dynamic Analysis of Export Cartels: The Japanese Case," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(363), pages 685-96, September.
- Reichert, Alan K & Lockett, Michael & Rao, Ramesh P, 1996. "The Impact of Illegal Business Practice on Shareholder Returns," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 31(1), pages 67-85, February.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.