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Why Does It Matter That Beliefs and Valuations Be Correctly Represented?

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Author Info
Grant, Simon (Rice U)
Karni, Edi (Johns Hopkins U)

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Abstract

This paper contains an analysis of a simple principal-agent problem illustrating possible problems that arise when the principal ascribes to the agent subjective probabilities and utilities that are implied by the subjective expected utility model but do not represent the agent's beliefs and valuations. In particular, it is possible that an incentive contract designed by the principal induces the agent to choose an action that is not in the principal's best interest.

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File URL: http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~econ/papers/2003papers/02Grant.pdf
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Paper provided by Rice University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2003-02.

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Date of creation: Jul 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ecl:riceco:2003-02

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Camerer, Colin, . "Progress and Behavioral Game Theory," Working Papers 1004, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  2. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Karni, Edi, 2003. " On the Representation of Beliefs by Probabilities," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 17-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. George Loewenstein, 2000. "Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 426-432, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Paul M. Romer, 2000. "Thinking and Feeling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 439-443, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Karni, Edi, 1996. "Probabilities and Beliefs," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 249-62, November.
  7. Karni, Edi & Schmeidler, David, 1993. "On the Uniqueness of Subjective Probabilities," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 267-77, April.
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  8. Luce, R Duncan & Krantz, David H, 1971. "Conditional Expected Utility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(2), pages 253-71, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Romer, Paul M., 2000. "Thinking and Feeling," Research Papers 1618, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  10. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Camerer, Colin F, 1997. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 167-88, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Jon Elster, 1998. "Emotions and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 47-74, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. E. Karni & Ph. Mongin, 1997. "On the determination of subjective probability by choices," THEMA Working Papers 97-37, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marie-Louise Vierø, 2006. "Contracting in Vague Environments," Working Papers 1106, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Sadowski, Philipp, 2008. "Conditional Preference for Flexibility: Eliciting Beliefs from Behavior," MPRA Paper 8614, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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