AbstractIncreasing political and economic interconnectedness draws much philosophical attention to the question of the conditions under which such stringent claims arise. Do claims of justice arise only among those who share membership in a state? Alternatively, do they arise among all those who are jointly subject to the global political and economic order? Or do they apply among all human beings simply because they are human? Inquiries into global justice differ from those into international justice precisely by not limiting inquiry to what states should do. They may well also question the very moral acceptability of states, and explore alternative arrangements. This article surveys the recent philosophical debate on global justice.
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- NEP-ALL-2011-02-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-HME-2011-02-05 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
- NEP-HPE-2011-02-05 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2011-02-05 (Law & Economics)
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- Risse, Mathias, 2006. "What to Say about the State," Working Paper Series rwp06-008, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
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