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Rotation Schemes In Politics - An Experimental Examination

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  • Verena Waldner
  • Martin Kocher
  • Matthias Sutter

Abstract

Rotation schemes in political organizations imply the temporary exclusion of some organization’s members (outsiders) from decision-making. Consequently, only a fraction of members (insiders) has a direct influence in the decision-making process, whose results, however, concern and affect all members of the organization. Even though rotation schemes have been implemented in some political organizations – and are about to become more important in the European Union in the course of future enlargements – the political and economic consequences of rotation schemes, compared to an encompassing representation system, have not been thoroughly studied. We examine the effects of rotation schemes on the provision of a public good in groups. In particular, we study the degree of cooperation of (rotating) insiders and outsiders in an experiment and compare cooperation in rotation schemes with cooperation levels without rotation.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 with number 38.

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Date of creation: 17 Sep 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2004:38

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Cited by:
  1. Ronald Bosman & Philipp Maier & Vijollca Sadiraj & Frans van Winden, 2004. "Let Me Vote! An Experimental Study of the Effects of Vote Rotation in Committees," DNB Working Papers 023, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  2. Ullrich, Katrin, 2004. "Decision-Making of the ECB: Reform and Voting Power," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-70, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  3. R. Bosman & P. Maier & V. Sadiraj & F. van Winden, . "Let Me Vote! An experimental study of vote rotation in committees," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-18, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, revised Aug 2013.

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