This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Price-Capping regulation as a protectionist strategy in developing countries

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Lawrence, Peter (Keele University)
Arijit Mukherjee

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In developing countries undergoing liberalising reforms, there are typically local incumbents facing the loss of protection. Strategic lobbying by such firms for a price-capping regulatory regime can deter entry. We show that a regulatory price can be set such that the net profit of the entrant is lower than the entry cost thus deterring entry and that it is possible for the profit of the incumbent to be greater under regulation than under unregulated duopoly. We consider the case of multiple incumbents threatened by entry and also extend our analysis to incorporate lobbying by the entrant.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://repec.org/res2003/Lawrence.pdf
File Format:
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 with number 132.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 04 Jun 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2003:132

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/society/annualconf.asp
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: entrant; incumbent; lobbying; price-capping regulation;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alberto Iozzi, 2000. "Strategic Pricing And Entry Deterrence Under Proce Cap Regulation," Departmental Working Papers 130, Tor Vergata University, CEIS. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Schmalensee, Richard, 1987. "Competitive advantage and collusive optima," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 351-367. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Koski, Heli A. & Majumdar, Sumit K., 2002. "Paragons of virtue? Competitor entry and the strategies of incumbents in the U.S. local telecommunications industry," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 453-480, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Braillard, S. Lael & Verdier, Thierry, 1994. "Lobbying and adjustment in declining industries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 586-595, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Brainard, S. Lael & Verdier, Thierry, 1997. "The political economy of declining industries: Senescent industry collapse revisited," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 221-237, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Aradhna Aggarwal, 2002. "Liberalisation, multinational enterprises and export performance: evidence from Indian manufacturing," The Journal of Development Studies, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 38(3), pages 119-137, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Murali Patibandla, 2002. "Policy reforms and evolution of market structure in an emerging economy: the case of India," The Journal of Development Studies, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 38(3), pages 95-118, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? The yearly budget of IDEAS is exactly $0: it relies entirely on volunteer work.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.