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Transactions That Did Not Happen and Their Influence on Prices

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Author Info
Kirman, Alan (GREQAM, EHESS, IUF Marseille)
Wolfgang Hardle
Rainer Schulz
Axel Werwatz

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Abstract

This paper studies data from the wholesale fruit and vegetables market in Marseille. We have details of counteroffers to the prices that were proposed by the seller even when no transaction took place. With a simple heoretical model we analyse the evolution of prices during the day and in particular the relation between the final price struck and the proposals of the two parties. Periods with no buyer refusals, of offers or bargaining with no transaction will lead to a revision of the sellerÕs first price. More importantly the sharing of the surplus moves in the buyerÕs favour during the day. These presumptions are then shown to be confirmed by our data set.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 with number 123.

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Date of creation: 04 Jun 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2003:123

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Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/society/annualconf.asp
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Related research
Keywords: bargaining; markets;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness

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  1. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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