IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecj/ac2002/7.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On Corruption and Institutions in Decentralised Economies

Author

Listed:
  • Andrianova, Svetlana

    (Loughborough University)

Abstract

This paper studies opportunistic behaviour in a model of decentralised economic exchange and inadequate institutional framework of formal contract enforcement. It is shown that (i) when the number of cheating traders is sufficiently large, inadequate institutions result in a loss of decentralised trading contracts which suggests yet another explanation of the output fall puzzle of the recent transition experience; (ii) while being necessary for the attainment of a Pareto optimal outcome, an adequate institutional framework may not be sufficient if traders perceive it as inadequate; and (iii) in the presence of adequate institutional framework, even if enforcers are corrupt contractual breach is deterred when enforcers enjoy strong bargaining power.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrianova, Svetlana, 2002. "On Corruption and Institutions in Decentralised Economies," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 7, Royal Economic Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2002:7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repec.org/res2002/Andrianova.pdf
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2002:7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christopher F. Baum (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/resssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.