An Equilibrium Analysis of Marriage, Divorce and Risk-Sharing
AbstractThis paper considers marriage, divorce and reciprocity-based cooperation by couples in the form of sharing of earnings-risk. While risk sharing is one benefit to marriage it is also limited by divorce risk. With search in the marriage market there may be multiple equilibria differing not only in family formation and dissolution patterns but also in the role of marriage in providing informal insurance. Publicly provided earnings-insurance, despite potential equilibrium multiplicity, is shown to affect family formation and financial cooperation monotonically.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 with number 6.
Date of creation: 29 Aug 2002
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- Dan Anderberg, 2001. "An Equilibrium Analysis of Marriage, Divorce and Risk-Sharing," CESifo Working Paper Series 555, CESifo Group Munich.
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