Emerging Market Lending: Is Moral Hazard Endogenous?
AbstractThis paper looks at the effect of moral hazard, resulting from information asymmetries in financial markets, on growth in financially open developing countries. We show that if domestic entrepreneurs can gamble with foreign creditors' money, borrowing under standard debt contracts is constrained by a No-Gambling Condition similar to that of Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000). However, this incentive constraint is endogenous in the development process: growth increases entrepreneurs' own capital at risk, thus reducing gambling incentives, but it decreases profitability of capital investment, which has the opposite effect. General equilibrium under moral hazard shows a unique and stable steady state, but involves at least temporary rationing of profitable projects and possibly capital flight from developing countries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 with number 35.
Date of creation: 29 Aug 2002
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-07-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENT-2002-07-04 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-FMK-2002-07-08 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-MFD-2002-07-08 (Microfinance)
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- Rungrudee Suetorsak, 2006. "Banking crisis in east asia: A micro/macro perspective," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 219-248, May.
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