Competitive Balance and Income Redistribution in Team Sports
AbstractThis paper starts with the observation that in most individualistic sports (e.g. golf, tennis, boxing) rewards are highly dependent on performance, while in most team sports direct rewards are almost independent of performance. This paper takes the perspective of Contest (Tournament) Theory and considers the incentive properties of revenue sharing agreements which are performance independent and performance related. The analysis is extended to balance-dependent income such as collective broadcast contracts.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Royal Economic Society in its series Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 with number 173.
Date of creation: 29 Aug 2002
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- Stefano Vecchione & Francesco Addesa, 2012. "Il Regime Fiscale Dei Calciatori: Un’Analisi Economica Comparata," Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport, Centro di diritto e business dello Sport, vol. 8(3), pages 49-71, dicembre.
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