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Structural econometric approach to bidding in the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem

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  • Cassola, Nuno
  • Ewerhart, Christian
  • Morana, Claudio

Abstract

This paper contributes to the existing literature on central bank repoauctions. It is based on a structural econometric approach, whereby the primitives of bidding behavior (individual bid schedules and bid-shading components) are directly estimated. With the estimated parameters we calibrate a theoretical model in order to illustrate some comparative static results. Overall the results suggest that strategic and optimal behavior is prevalent in ECB tenders. We find evidence of a statistically significant bid-shading component, even though the number of bidders is very large. Bid- shading increases with liquidity uncertainty and decreases with the number of participants. JEL Classification: G21, G12, D44, E43, E50

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by European Central Bank in its series Working Paper Series with number 0793.

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Date of creation: Aug 2007
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Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20070793

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Keywords: monetary policy implementation; primary money; repo auctions;

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References

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  1. Matthew Shum, 2000. "Nonparametric Tests for Common Values," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1598, Econometric Society.
  2. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Strebulaev, Ilya A. & Bindseil, Ulrich, 2002. "Bidding and performance in repo auctions: evidence from ECB open market operations," Working Paper Series 0157, European Central Bank.
  3. Kyle, Albert S, 1989. "Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(3), pages 317-55, July.
  4. Matt Shum & Phil Haile & Han Hong, 2003. "Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First-Price Auctions," Economics Working Paper Archive 501, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  5. Ewerhart, Christian & Cassola, Nuno & Valla, Natacha, 2010. "Declining valuations and equilibrium bidding in central bank refinancing operations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 30-43, January.
  6. Viswanathan, S. & Wang, James J. D., 2002. "Market architecture: limit-order books versus dealership markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 127-167, April.
  7. Philip A. Haile & Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2003. "Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," NBER Working Papers 10105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Athey, Susan & Haile, Philip A., 2007. "Nonparametric Approaches to Auctions," Handbook of Econometrics, in: J.J. Heckman & E.E. Leamer (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 6, chapter 60 Elsevier.
  9. Cassola, N. & Ewerhart , C. & Valla, N., 2006. "Declining Valuations and Equilibrium Bidding Central Bank Refinancing Operations," Working papers 151, Banque de France.
  10. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-77, November.
  11. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F, 1993. "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 733-64.
  12. Giuseppe Bruno & Ernesto Maurizio Ordine & Antonio Scalia, 2005. "BanksÂ’ participation in the Eurosystem auctions and money market integration," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 562, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  13. Wilson, Robert, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-89, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Ewerhart, Christian & Cassola, Nuno & Valla, Natacha, 2006. "Declining valuations and equilibrium bidding in central bank refinancing operations," Working Paper Series 0668, European Central Bank.
  2. Cassola, N. & Ewerhart , C. & Valla, N., 2006. "Declining Valuations and Equilibrium Bidding Central Bank Refinancing Operations," Working papers 151, Banque de France.

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