Settlement finality as a public good in large-value payment systems
AbstractTarget is a real time gross settlement (RTGS) large value payment network operated by European central banks that eliminates systemic risk. Euro1 is a privately operated delayed net settlement (DNS) network that reduces substantially systemic risk but does not eliminate it. This difference makes RTGS networks more expensive to users even if both networks had the same unit operating costs. This provides an incentive for users to shift payments to the more risky network in normal times and back to Target in times of financial market disruption. The estimated extra cost to a DNS network from posting collateral sufficient to cover all exposures (and eliminate systemic risk) is from 15 to 42 cents per transaction. If full cost recovery on an RTGS system were reduced by this amount, user collateral costs but not risks would be equalized between networks. Full collateralization on DNS networks equalizes both user costs and risks. JEL Classification: E58, G15, H23, H41
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European Central Bank in its series Working Paper Series with number 0506.
Date of creation: Jul 2005
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Other versions of this item:
- David Humphrey & Henri Pages, 2005. "Settlement finality as a public good in large-value payment systems," Public Economics 0509003, EconWPA.
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-10-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2005-10-04 (European Economics)
- NEP-FIN-2005-10-04 (Finance)
- NEP-MAC-2005-10-04 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2005-10-04 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sawaichiro Kamata, 1990. "Managing risk in Japanese interbank payment systems," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Fall, pages 18-32.
- Rzonca, Andrzej & Cizkowicz, Piotr, 2005. "Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contraction in new member states," Working Paper Series 0519, European Central Bank.
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