This paper uses a large panel of bilateral bank flow data to assess how institutions and politics affect international capital -bank in particular- flows. The following key findings emerge: 1) The empirical "gravity" model is the benchmark in explaining the volume of international banking activities. 2) Conditioned on standard gravity factors (distance, GDP, population), well-functioning institutions are a key driving force for international bank flows. Specifically, foreign banks invest substantially more in countries with i) uncorrupt bureaucracies, ii) high-quality legal system, and iii) a non-government controlled banking system. 3) Beyond institutions, politics exert also a firstorder impact. 4) The European Integration process has spurred cross-border banking activities between member states. These results are robust to various econometric methodologies, samples and the potential endogeneity of institutional characteristics. The strong institutions/politics-bank flows nexus has strong implications for asset trade and international macro theories, which have not modelled these relationships explicitly.
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Paper provided by European Central Bank in its series Working Paper Series with number
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Find related papers by JEL classification: F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
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Wacziarg, Romain & Alesina, Alberto & Devleeschauwer, Arnaud & Easterly, William & Kurlat, Sergio, 2002.
"Fractionalization,"
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[Downloadable!]
Alberto Alesina & Arnaud Devleeschauwer & William Easterly & Sergio Kurlat & Romain Wacziarg, 2003.
"Fractionalization,"
NBER Working Papers
9411, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2003.
"Unbundling Institutions,"
NBER Working Papers
9934, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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