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Regulation of multinational banks - a theoretical inquiry

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Author Info
Giacomo Calzolari () (Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy)
Gyöngyi Lóránth () (London Business School)

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Abstract

This paper examines prudential regulation of a multinational bank (MNB hereafter) and shows how regulatory intervention depends on the liability structure and insurance arrangements for non local depositors (i.e. on the representation form for foreign units). Shared liability among the MNB’s units gives higher incentives for regulatory intervention than when units are legally separate entities. Cross-border deposit insurance provides lower incentives to intervene than when the regulator only has to compensate local depositors. We study the impact of shared liability and deposit insurance arrangements on regulators’ incentives to monitor and acquire information on MNB’s activities. Furthermore, by describing regulatory intervention and monitoring we also draw implications on the MNB’s preferences over the form representation for foreign units, and discuss the effects of regulators’ behavior on both MNB’s lobbying and international resources shifting.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by European Central Bank in its series Working Paper Series with number 431.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20050431

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Related research
Keywords: Multinational Banks; Prudential Regulation; Representation Form; Subsidiary; Branch;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gyongyi Loranth & Alan Morrison, 2003. "Multinational Bank Capital Regulation with Deposit Insurance and Diversification Effects," OFRC Working Papers Series 2003fe11, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  2. Dewatripont, Mathias & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1027-54, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Charles Kahn & Andrew Winton, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(6), pages 2531-2575, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Feenstra, Robert C & Lewis, Tracy R, 1991. "Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1287-307, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Acharya, Viral V, 2002. "Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3253, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Buch, Claudia M. & Golder, Stefan M., 2001. "Foreign versus domestic banks in Germany and the US: a tale of two markets?," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 11(4-5), pages 341-361, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Guzman, Andrew T, 1999. "An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 775-808, October.
    Other versions:
  9. Lóránth, Gyöngyi & Morrison, Alan, 2003. "Multinational Bank Regulation with Deposit Insurance and Diversification Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 4148, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Giacomo Calzolari, 2004. "Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(1), pages 257-282, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Marquez, Robert, 2006. "Competition among regulators and credit market integration," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 401-430, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Rafael Repullo, 2001. "A model of takeovers of foreign banks," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Holopainen, Helena, 2007. "Integration of financial supervision," Research Discussion Papers 12/2007, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alexis Derviz, 2005. "Cross-border Risk Transmission by a Multinational Bank," Working Papers IES 85, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Holthausen, Cornelia & Rønde, Thomas, 2005. "Cooperation in International Banking Supervision," CEPR Discussion Papers 4990, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Thomas Harr & Thomas Rønde, 2006. "Regulation of Banking Groups," FRU Working Papers 2006/01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Finance Research Unit. [Downloadable!]
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