Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

EU fiscal rules: issues and lessons from political economy

Contents:

Author Info

  • Schuknecht, Ludger

Abstract

The paper analyses the EU fiscal rules from a political economy perspective and derives some policy lessons. Following a literature survey, the paper stresses the importance of appropriate incentives for rule compliance in an environment where national fiscal sovereignty precludes the option of centralised enforcement. In addition, the paper stresses the importance of clear and simple rules and in particular the 3% deficit limit in anchoring expectations of fiscal discipline and facilitating public and market monitoring of public finances. This, in turn, strengthens incentive for rule compliance. Moreover, the paper discusses the interests of the most important players in European fiscal rule formation and the importance of choosing the appropriate time for initiating a reform debate. JEL Classification: D7, H3, H6

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp421.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by European Central Bank in its series Working Paper Series with number 0421.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20040421

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Postfach 16 03 19, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Phone: +49 69 1344 0
Fax: +49 69 1344 6000
Web page: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/index.en.html
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: Press and Information Division, European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Email:

Related research

Keywords: deficits; fiscal rules; institutional reform; political economy; Stability and Growth Pact;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Philipp C. Rother & Marco Catenaro & Gerhard Schwab, 2004. "Aging and Pensions in the Euro Area," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 60(4), pages 593-, December.
  2. George Kopits & Steven A. Symansky, 1998. "Fiscal Policy Rules," IMF Occasional Papers 162, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Albert Jaeger & Ludger Schuknecht, 2007. "Boom-Bust Phases in Asset Prices and Fiscal Policy Behavior," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 43(6), pages 45-66, November.
  4. J. de Haan & H. Berger & D. Jansen, 2003. "The end of the stability and growth pact?," WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) 748, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  5. Marín, José M., 2002. "Sustainability of public finances and automatic stabilisation under a rule of budgetary discipline," Working Paper Series 0193, European Central Bank.
  6. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, . "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Working Papers 121, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  7. Fernández-Huertas Moraga, Jesús & Vidal, Jean-Pierre, 2004. "Fiscal sustainability and public debt in an endogenous growth model," Working Paper Series 0395, European Central Bank.
  8. Galí, Jordi & Perotti, Roberto, 2003. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Integration in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 3933, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
  10. André Sapir & Philippe Aghion & Giuseppe Bertola & Martin Hellwig & Jean Pisani-Ferry & Bernard Lange & José Viñals & Helen Wallace & Marco Buti & Mario Nava & Peter Smith, 2004. "An agenda for a growing Europe: the Sapir report," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8070, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  11. Felix Eschenbach & Ludger Schuknecht, 2004. "Budgetary risks from real estate and stock markets," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 19(39), pages 313-346, 07.
  12. Vincent Koen & Paul van den Noord, 2005. "Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe: One-Off Measures and Creative Accounting," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 417, OECD Publishing.
  13. Bernoth, Kerstin & von Hagen, Jürgen & Schuknecht, Ludger, 2003. "Sovereign risk premia in the European government bond market," ZEI Working Papers B 26-2003, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
  14. Hallerberg, Mark & Strauch, Rolf & Hagen, Jürgen von, 2006. "The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 150, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  15. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  16. de Haan, Jakob & Berger, Helge & Jansen, David-Jan, 2003. "The end of stability and growth pact?," Discussion Papers 2003/16, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  17. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Xavier Debrun, 2005. "Implementing the Stability and Growth Pact," IMF Working Papers 05/59, International Monetary Fund.
  18. Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier, 2005. "Implementing the Stability and Growth Pact: Enforcement and Procedural Flexibility," CEPR Discussion Papers 5005, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. George Kopits & J. D. Craig, 1998. "Transparency in Government Operations," IMF Occasional Papers 158, International Monetary Fund.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Mark Mink & Jakob de Haan, 2005. "Has the Stability and Growth Pact Impeded Political Budget Cycles in the European Union?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1532, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Xavier Debrun, 2005. "Implementing the Stability and Growth Pact," IMF Working Papers 05/59, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Ondrej Schneider, 2009. "Reforming Pensions in Europe: Economic Fundamentals and Political Factors," CESifo Working Paper Series 2572, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier, 2005. "Implementing the stability and growth pact: enforcement and procedural flexibility," Working Paper Series 0433, European Central Bank.
  5. Buti, M. & Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Franco, D., 2005. "The Stability pact Pains: A Forward-Looking Assessment of the Reform Debate," Discussion Paper 2005-101, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Michael Sturm & Nikolaus Siegfried, 2005. "Regional monetary integration in the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council," Occasional Paper Series 31, European Central Bank.
  7. Rülke, Jan-Christoph & Frenkel, Michael & Lis, Eliza, 2013. "Do budget balance rules anchor budget balance expectations? -- Some international evidence," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80050, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  8. Hallerberg, Mark & Wolff, Guntram B., 2006. "Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2006,35, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  9. Mark Hallerberg & Guntram Wolff, 2008. "Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 379-396, September.
  10. Anthony Annett, 2006. "Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact," IMF Working Papers 06/116, International Monetary Fund.
  11. David Prušvic, 2010. "European Fiscal Policy Rules: First 15 Years," Politická ekonomie, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2010(1), pages 51-69.
  12. Holm-Hadulla, Fédéric & Hauptmeier, Sebastian & Rother, Philipp, 2010. "The impact of numerical expenditure rules on budgetary discipline over the cycle," Working Paper Series 1169, European Central Bank.
  13. Paolo Biraschi, . "Searching for the optimal EMU fiscal rule:an ex-post analysis of the SGP reform proposals," Working Papers wp2008-7, Department of the Treasury, Ministry of the Economy and of Finance.
  14. Otmar Issing, 2006. "Europe’s hard fix: the Euro area," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 181-196, December.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20040421. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Official Publications).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.