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Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions

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Author Info
Marco Catenaro () (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.)
Jean-Pierre Vidal () (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.)

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Abstract

In the context of a stylised game theoretical framework of capital tax competition, we show that when repeated policy interactions are associated to a systematic punishment of the deviating policymaker, a co-ordinated outcome can be the solution to the non co-operative tax game. This result suggests that explicit forms of policy co-ordination, such as a centralised tax authority, could in fact be largely unnecessary. JEL Classification: E61; H87.

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Paper provided by European Central Bank in its series Working Paper Series with number 259.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20030259

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Related research
Keywords: Policy co-ordination international fiscal issues.

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. António Afonso & Ludger Schuknecht & Vito Tanzi, 2005. "Public sector efficiency: An international comparison," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 321-347, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Bernd Schnatz & Chiara Osbat & Rasmus Rueffer, 2003. "The rise of the Yen vis-a-vis the ('Synthetic') Euro: is it supported by economic fundamentals?," Working Paper Series 224, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Efrem Castelnuovo, 2004. "Describing the Fed's conduct with simple Taylor rules: is interest rate smoothing important?," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 12, Money Macro and Finance Research Group. [Downloadable!]
  4. Miquel A. Leon-Ledesma & Peter McAdam, 2003. "Unemployment, hysteresis and transition," Working Paper Series 234, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Ignazio Angeloni & Gunter Coenen & Frank Smets, 2003. "Persistence, The Transmission Mechanism And Robust Monetary Policy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 50(5), pages 527-549, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Livio Stracca & David Fielding, 2003. "Myopic loss aversion; disappointment aversion; and the equity premium puzzle," Working Paper Series 203, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Inoue, Atsushi & Kilian, Lutz, 2003. "On the Selection of Forecasting Models," CEPR Discussion Papers 3809, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Andrea Zaghini, 2003. "Trade advantages and specialisation dynamics in acceding countries," Working Paper Series 249, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  1. Hans Pitlik, 2005. "Folgt die Steuerpolitik in der EU der Logik des Steuerwettbewerbs," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 256/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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