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Learning, uncertainty and Central Bank activism in an economy with strategic interactions

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Author Info
Natacha Valla () (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, Postfach 16 03 19, 60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.)
Martin Ellison () (University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom.)

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Abstract

In this paper we examine the optimal level of central bank activism in a standard model of monetary policy with uncertainty, learning and strategic interactions. We calibrate the model using G7 data and find that the presence of strategic interactions between the central bank and private agents creates an additional motivation for caution in optimal monetary policy. An active policy designed to help learning and reduce future uncertainty creates extra volatility in inflation expectations, which is detrimental to welfare. JEL Classification: D81; D83; D84; E52; E58.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by European Central Bank in its series Working Paper Series with number 28.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20000028

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Related research
Keywords: Activism learning monetary policy strategic interactions uncertainty.

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Svensson, Lars E O, 1999. "Price-Level Targeting versus Inflation Targeting: A Free Lunch?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(3), pages 277-95, August.
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  3. Balvers, Ronald J & Cosimano, Thomas F, 1994. "Inflation Variability and Gradualist Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(4), pages 721-38, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bertocchi, Graziella & Spagat, Michael, 1993. "Learning, experimentation, and monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 169-183, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Volker Wieland, 1998. "Monetary policy and uncertainty about the natural unemployment rate," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-22, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ellison, Martin, 2003. "The Learning Cost of Interest Rate Reversals," CEPR Discussion Papers 4135, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Michael Spagat & Joao Mauricio Rosal, 2004. "Structural uncertainty and central bank conservatism: the ignorant should keep their eyes shut," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003 93, Money Macro and Finance Research Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Lars E.O. Svensson & Noah M. Williams, 2007. "Bayesian and Adaptive Optimal Policy under Model Uncertainty," NBER Working Papers 13414, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Ehrmann , Michael & Ellison, Martin & Valla, Natacha, 2001. "Regime-dependent impulse response functions in a Markov-switching vector autoregression model," Research Discussion Papers 11/2001, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Volker Wieland, 2006. "Monetary Policy and Uncertainty about the Natural Unemployment Rate: Brainard-Style Conservatism versus Experimental Activism," Advances in Macroeconomics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 6(1), pages 1288-1288. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. M. Demertzis & N. Viegi, 2004. "Aiming for the Bull's Eye: Inflation Targeting under Uncertainty," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 88, Netherlands Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Ellison, Martin & Sarno, Lucio & Vilmunen, Jouko, 2004. "Monetary policy and learning in an open economy," Research Discussion Papers 3/2004, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Schaling, E., 2003. "Learning, inflation reduction and optimal monetary policy," Discussion Paper 74, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  9. Eugenio Domingo Solans, 2000. "How should monetary policymakers respond to the new challenges of global economic integration? : commentary," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 277-287. [Downloadable!]
  10. Miller, Marcus & Thampanishvong, Kannika & Zhang, Lei, 2003. "Learning to Forget? Contagion and Political Risk in Brazil," CEPR Discussion Papers 3785, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Alberto Locarno, 2007. "Imperfect Knowledge, Adaptive Learning, and the Bias Against Activist Monetary Policies," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(3), pages 47-85, September. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Schaling, Eric, 2003. "Learning, inflation expectations and optimal monetary policy," Research Discussion Papers 20/2003, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Lars E.O. Svensson & Noah Williams, 2008. "Optimal Monetary Policy under Uncertainty in DSGE Models: A Markov Jump-Linear-Quadratic Approach," NBER Working Papers 13892, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Robert Tetlow & Peter von zur Muehlen, 2004. "Avoiding Nash Inflation: Bayesian and Robus Responses to Model Uncertainty," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(4), pages 869-899, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Maria Demertzis & Nicola Viegi, 2004. "The Dynamic Properties of Inflation Targeting Under Uncertainty," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 113, Netherlands Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
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