Regulating access to international large-value payment systems
AbstractThis paper studies access regulation to international large-value payment systems when banking supervision is national task. We focus on the choice between net settlement or imposing real time gross settlement. As a novel feature, the communication between the supervisors is endogenized. It is shown that the national supervisors' preferences regarding the settlement method are not perfectly aligned. As a result, systemic risk is excessive under public regulation. Still, leaving access regulation to the private banks can only be optimal if they have superior information about the risk of their foreign counterparty in the settlement system. JEL Classification: E58, G20, G28
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European Central Bank in its series Working Paper Series with number 0022.
Date of creation: Jun 2000
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Other versions of this item:
- Cornelia Holthausen & Thomas R¯nde, 2002. "Regulating Access to International Large-Value Payment Systems," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(5), pages 1561-1586.
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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