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An Eye-Tracking Study of Feature-Based Choice in One-Shot Games

Author

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  • Giovanna Devetag
  • Sibilla Di Guida
  • Luca Polonio

Abstract

We analyze subjects’ eye movements while they make decisions in a series of one-shot games. The majority of them perform a partial and selective analysis of the payoff matrix, often ignoring the payoffs of the opponent and/or paying attention only to specific cells. Our results suggest that subjects apply boundedly rational decision heuristics that involve best responding to a simplification of the decision problem, obtained either by ignoring the other players’ motivations or by considering them only for a subset of outcomes. Finally, we find a correlation between types of eye movements observed and choices in the games.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanna Devetag & Sibilla Di Guida & Luca Polonio, 2013. "An Eye-Tracking Study of Feature-Based Choice in One-Shot Games," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2013-06, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/138438
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    Cited by:

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    3. Raúl López-Pérez & Eli Spiegelman, 2020. "Using Eye-Tracking Techniques To Understand The Role Of Attention On Choice And Reversals," Working Papers 2001, Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC.
    4. Polonio, Luca & Di Guida, Sibilla & Coricelli, Giorgio, 2015. "Strategic sophistication and attention in games: An eye-tracking study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 80-96.
    5. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Alexander Jaudas & Alexander Ritschel, 2021. "Attentional shifts and preference reversals: An eye-tracking study," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 16(1), pages 57-93, January.
    6. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Alexander Jaudas & Alexander Ritschel, 2021. "Effortful Bayesian updating: A pupil-dilation study," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 81-102, August.
    7. J. Hausfeld & K. von Hesler & S. Goldlücke, 2021. "Strategic gaze: an interactive eye-tracking study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(1), pages 177-205, March.
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    9. Fiedler, Susann & Hillenbrand, Adrian, 2020. "Gain-loss framing in interdependent choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 232-251.
    10. Anastasia G Peshkovskaya & Tatiana S Babkina & Mikhail G Myagkov & Ivan A Kulikov & Ksenia V Ekshova & Kyle Harriff, 2017. "The socialization effect on decision making in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An eye-tracking study," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(4), pages 1-15, April.
    11. Fischbacher, Urs & Hausfeld, Jan & Renerte, Baiba, 2022. "Strategic incentives undermine gaze as a signal of prosocial motives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 63-91.
    12. Barrafrem, Kinga & Hausfeld, Jan, 2020. "Tracing risky decisions for oneself and others: The role of intuition and deliberation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    13. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Alexander Ritschel, 2022. "Attention and salience in preference reversals," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(3), pages 1024-1051, June.
    14. Despoina Alempaki & Andrew M. Colman & Felix Kölle & Graham Loomes & Briony D. Pulford, 2022. "Investigating the failure to best respond in experimental games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(2), pages 656-679, April.
    15. David J. Cooper & Ian Krajbich & Charles N. Noussair, 2019. "Choice-Process Data in Experimental Economics," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(1), pages 1-13, August.
    16. George Loewenstein & Zachary Wojtowicz, 2023. "The Economics of Attention," CESifo Working Paper Series 10712, CESifo.
    17. Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D. & Sachdeva, Ashish, 2018. "The path to equilibrium in sequential and simultaneous games: A mousetracking study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 246-274.
    18. Marchiori, Davide & Di Guida, Sibilla & Polonio, Luca, 2021. "Plasticity of strategic sophistication in interactive decision-making," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
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    20. Correa Romar, 2014. "Mathematical Foci," Mathematical Economics Letters, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1-2), pages 1-7, August.
    21. Joshua Zonca & Giorgio Coricelli & Luca Polonio, 2019. "Does exposure to alternative decision rules change gaze patterns and behavioral strategies in games?," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(1), pages 14-25, August.
    22. Polonio, Luca & Coricelli, Giorgio, 2019. "Testing the level of consistency between choices and beliefs in games using eye-tracking," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 566-586.
    23. Stephanie M. Smith & Ian Krajbich & Ryan Webb, 2019. "Estimating the dynamic role of attention via random utility," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(1), pages 97-111, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    one-shot games; eye-tracking; similarity; categorization; focal points; experimental economics; individual behavior; behavioral economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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