Joint Bidding in Infrastructure Procurement
AbstractTo utilize public resources efficiently, it is required to take full advantage of competition in public procurement auctions. Joint bidding practices are one of the possible ways of facilitating auction competition. In theory, there are pros and cons. It may enable firms to pool their financial and experiential resources and remove the barrier to entry. On the other hand, it may reduce the degree of competition and can be used as a cover of collusive behavior. The paper empirically addresses whether joint bidding is pro- or anti-competitive in ODA procurement auctions for infrastructure projects. It is found that there is no strong evidence that joint bidding practices are compatible with competition policy, except for a few cases. In road procurements, coalitional bidding involving both local and foreign firms has been found pro-competitive. In the water and sewage sector, local joint bidding may be useful to draw out better offers from potential contractors. Joint bidding composed of only foreign companies is mostly considered anticompetitive.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series Working Papers ECARES with number 2008_019.
Length: 29 p.
Date of creation: Mar 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by: ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles
Public procurement; auction theory; infrastructure development; joint bidding;
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2008-10-21 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-PBE-2008-10-21 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2008-10-21 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Antonio Estache & A. Iimi, 2009.
"Auctions with Endogenous Participation and Quality Thresholds: Evidence from ODA Infrastructure Procurement,"
Working Papers ECARES
2009_006, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2009. "Auctions with endogenous participation and quality thresholds : evidence from ODA infrastructure procurement," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4853, The World Bank.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Benoit Pauwels).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.