Given a noticeable degradation of patent quality, patenting has come to resemble the purchase of a lottery ticket. Rising cost of engaging in litigation over intellectual property (IP) assets substantially diminishes their value as an incentive to invest in research (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). The author proposes an option-based view (OBV) of imperfect patent protection as a formal strategic model of so-called probabilistic patents (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005), which may serve as a starting point for further investigations into the impact of patent risk on firm values and research incentives. More specifically, the real option approach is employed to demonstrate how, due to increased litigation activity in red oceans, rising profit rates may lead to falling patent values, calling for a careful tradeoff between reliable patent protection in mature markets and seemingly attractive business opportunities in industries such as pharmaceutical biotechnology.
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Paper provided by Department of Finance and Accounting, EUROPEAN BUSINESS SCHOOL (ebs), International University Schloß Reichartshausen in its series ebs Working Papers on Finance and Accounting with number
060601.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Investment Policy O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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