Strategic factor market theory suggests that without luck or asymmetric expectations, firms can't appropriate gains from acquired resources. Adopting the bargaining perspective on resource advantage, we hold that this is only true in the absence of resource complementarity. We extend factor market theory to account for resource complementarity, and we show that firms can profit when they exhibit superior complementarity to target resources, even in the absence of asymmetric expectations. Thus we provide an alternative interpretation of managers' recent emphasis on externally acquired resources.
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Paper provided by IESE Business School in its series IESE Research Papers with number
D/666.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Jerker Denrell & Christina Fang & Sidney Winter, 2003.
"The Economics of Strategic Opportunity,"
LEM Papers Series
2003/10, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
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