Do business angels alter the risk-return equation in early stage investments? Business angels as seen by venture capitalists in the German speaking countries
AbstractVenture capitalists in German-speaking countries do not value the contribution of business angels in co-invested deals. Business angels do not reduce the risk perceived by venture capitalists in early-stage deals, even if the business angels have what venture capitalists regard as an ideal profile. Venture capitalists also refute that deals with business angels typically generate higher internal rates of return than deals without business angels.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by IESE Business School in its series IESE Research Papers with number D/655.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 12 Oct 2006
Date of revision:
Venture capital; Business Angels;
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