Interest alignment and firm performance
AbstractThis study derives testable hypotheses from their framework and thus provides an empirical test of interest alignment theory based on a sample of 69 management buyouts in the UK. The results of the multivariate regression model suggest that in this setting, interest alignment does have a significant influence on firm performance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HEC Paris in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number 825.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2005
Date of revision:
competitive advantage; interest alignment; motivation; buyouts;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-04-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2006-04-01 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CFN-2006-04-01 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-FMK-2006-04-01 (Financial Markets)
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