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Interest alignment and competitive advantage Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Gottschalg, Oliver ()
Zollo, Mauricio ()
This paper articulates a theory of the conditions under which the alignment between individual and collective interests generates sustainable competitive advantage. The theory is based on the influence of tacitness, context-specificity and casual ambiguity in the determinants of different types of motivation (extrinsic, normative intrinsic and hedonic intrinsic), under varying conditions of environmental dynamism. The analysis indicates the need to consider mitivational processes as a complement to current resource and competence-based approaches in a comprehensive theory of competitive advantage.
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Paper provided by Groupe HEC in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number
823.
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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 30 Mar 2006Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0823Contact details of provider: Postal: HEC Business School, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex, France Web page: http://www.hec.fr/hec/eng/index.html More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: interest alignment competitive advantage Find related papers by JEL classification: L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
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