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Linkage principle, Multi-dimensional Signals and Blind Auctions

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Author Info
Thierry, FOUCAULT ()
Stefano, LOVO ()

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Abstract

We compare the seller’s expected revenue in a second price sealed bid auction for a single object in which bidders receive multidimensional signals. Bidders’ valuations for the object depend on their signals and a signal observed privately by the seller. We show in various examples that the seller can be better off not revealing publicly his signal. Hence the linkage principle does not necessarily hold when bidders receive multidimensional signals.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by HEC Paris in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number 785.

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Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0785

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Related research
Keywords: Auction Theory; Linkage Principle; Multidimensional Signals; Blind Auctions;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2991, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
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  1. Yossi Feinberg & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2005. "Anonymous Bidding and Revenue Maximization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-8.

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