Migratory policy in developing countries: how to bring best people back?
AbstractThis paper analyzes the decision of a migrant to return or stay within the framework of a signaling model with exogenous migratory costs. If employers have only imperfect information about the type of a worker and good workers migrate, bad workers might copy their strategy in order to get the same high wage as the good workers. Employers will therefore reduce the wage they pay to migrants and good workers incur a loss compared to the perfect information setup. In one hybrid equilibrium of the game, the more bad workers migrate, the higher the incentive for good workers to come back. Policy implications follow
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School in its series ESSEC Working Papers with number DR 08017.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision:
Temporary Migration; Return Migrants; Hybrid Bayesian Equilibrium; Signalling Model;
Other versions of this item:
- Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2008. "Migratory Policy In Developing Countries: How To Bring Best People Back?," CEPN Working Papers halshs-00344929, HAL.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
- J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-03-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-03-14 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-LAB-2009-03-14 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-MIG-2009-03-14 (Economics of Human Migration)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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