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CEO compensations in a stakeholders' regime : an empirical investigation with French listed companies

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Author Info
Cazavan-Jeny, Anne () (ESSEC Business School)
Margaine, Julien (ESSEC Business School)
Missonier-Piera, Franck () (EM-Lyon Business School)

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Abstract

Ces dernières années, la publication du niveau de rémunération des dirigeants a soulevé d’intenses controverses. Un certain nombre d’études ont mis en évidence une relation positive entre le salaire des dirigeants et la performance de la société, aux Etats-Unis et en Grande- Bretagne. La rémunération des dirigeants est également proche de la structure du gouvernement d’entreprise. Or la structure française de gouvernement d’entreprise est différente de celle observée aux États-Unis ou en Grande-Bretagne. En France, la tradition voulait que l’on ne divulgue pas ou peu d’information sur le niveau de rémunération des dirigeants. Cependant depuis 2002, les sociétés cotées doivent indiquer dans leurs rapports annuels le montant des rémunérations des dirigeants et des membres du conseil d’administration. (loi NRE, 15 mai 2001). A partir d’un échantillon de 110 sociétés cotées françaises sur la période 2002-2004 (indice SBF 120), l’objet de cette recherche est d’apporter des éclairages sur la rémunération des dirigeants dans un pays connu pour être plutôt conservateur sur le sujet. Pour étudier les déterminants de la rémunération des dirigeants, nous avons utilisé trois mesures de cette rémunération : la partie fixe du salaire, le bonus annuel et la rémunération globale. Les premiers résultats montrent que les trois mesures de la rémunération des dirigeants peuvent être expliquées par la taille de la société, et la partie variable (bonus) par la performance boursière. Les résultats sur le risque sont plus mitigés et indiquent que le risque spécifique de la firme est négativement associé à la rémunération des dirigeants, ce qui confirme les résultats de Gray et Cannela (1997). Enfin, les variables de gouvernance ont un impact significatif sur le niveau de rémunération des dirigeants.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School in its series ESSEC Working Papers with number DR 08015.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-08015

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Related research
Keywords: CEO compensation; Corporate governance; Performance;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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References listed on IDEAS
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    Other versions:
  3. Cosh, Andrew, 1975. "The Remuneration of Chief Executives in the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 85(337), pages 75-94, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Andjelkovic, Aleksandar & Boyle, Glenn & McNoe, Warren, 2002. "Public disclosure of executive compensation: Do shareholders need to know?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 97-117, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 65-105, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Conyon, Martin & Gregg, Paul & Machin, Stephen, 1995. "Taking Care of Business, Executive Compensation in the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 704-14, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Mueller, Dennis C. & Yun, S. Lawrence, 1997. "Managerial discretion and managerial compensation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 441-454, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Elston, Julie Ann & Goldberg, Lawrence G., 2003. "Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 1391-1410, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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